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 of September 1984, the foreign ministers of the ten 
EU
1
 member states, along with those of Spain and Portugal (then accession 
states), met with their Central American counterparts (and those of the 
Contadora group) in the Costa Rican capital, initiating what became known as 
the San José Dialogue. This became an institutionalised attempt to find a 
negotiated political solution to the crises that beset Central America throughout 
the 1980s. It also laid the foundations for closer interregional ties between 
Europe and the Central American isthmus as well as forming the basis for wider 
EU involvement in, and political relations with, Latin America as a whole; a 
region which had been very much neglected by European foreign policy for 




 anniversary of the first San José meeting approaches, the EU 
and Central America are in the process of concluding negotiations which would 
lead to the signing of an Association Agreement between both regional blocs, 
resulting in a potential Free Trade Area (FTA) between them
2
.  EU-Central 
American (EU-CA) relations have evolved over the course of the intervening 
years. They now form part of the set of interregional relationships which have 
                                                          
1
 For convenience, and in order to distinguish it from the European Commission, EU shall be used throughout to 
denote the European integration project through all its stages from the 1950s onwards. 
 
2
 The process was suspended in early July 2009 as a result of the constitutional crisis in Honduras. At the time 
of writing negotiations remain suspended. 
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become a hallmark of international relations since the end of the Cold War. 
These forms of interregional cooperation have been particularly typical of EU 
foreign and trade policy. 
  
This study aims to explore the key aspects of EU-CA relations and the 
way in which these relations have evolved over time. It will also attempt to 
explain the trend towards interregionalism in the context of EU-CA relations 
generally, and the proposed Association Agreement and FTA in particular. 
Relations between the EU and Central America, and indeed those between the 
EU and Latin America more generally, are often couched in very aspirational 
language. Emphasis is often placed on close historical and cultural links, or EU 
support for democracy and human rights. The intention of this dissertation is to 
look beyond the rhetoric of formal official statements and documents, and 
assess the true motives behind current forms of interregional cooperation. 
  
The study will take the form of a discussion of important aspects of EU-
CA relations and the factors which affect the process of EU-CA 
interregionalism. It will draw on a wide range of primary and secondary 
materials. Primary resources will include official documents such as the 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) signed in 2003 between 
  6 
the EU and Central America and which forms the framework for current 
relations. Another important primary source will be the European Commission 
(EC) Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for 2007-2013, which outlines the major 
aims of EU policy in the region. Further primary sources, such as Global 
Europe
3
 provide an insight into the wider objectives of EU economic policy and 
how this might have a bearing on how we should view EU-CA relations. The 
secondary material consulted, consists primarily of academic works on a variety 
of subjects, such as interregionalism, the trade policy of the EU, European 
relations with Latin America generally and Central America specifically, as 
well as a range of internet sources such as EU or SICA (Central American 
Integration System) websites- as well as websites of individual government 
agencies or NGOs. 
 
Following this introduction and a review of some of the key literature, the 
main body of the study will be broken down into two parts. The first section is 
mainly empirical in nature. It will look at important aspects of the EU-CA 
relationship under four broad headings:  political relations, economic relations, 
regional integration, and finally the proposed Association Agreement. The 
purpose of this section will be to give an overview of relations as they stand and 
the way in which they have evolved over the past quarter century. This will 
                                                          
3
 A document outlining the Commissions vision for a more competitive Europe in a globalised world 
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provide us with a basis for approaching the second part of the study, which will 
have a slightly more theoretical slant. It looks at the motives for interregional 
cooperation (particularly in its economic aspects), focussing on the way in 
which wider considerations of what could be termed globalisation, shape the 
way in which the EU and Central America interact with one another. 
 
Broadly speaking, as regards expected findings, the first conclusion I 
anticipate would be that EU-CA relations are asymmetrical, both in the sense 
that the EU is by far the larger partner, in terms of size and population, as well 
as economic power, and in the sense that European integration has been more 
successful than the Central American variant, giving the EU a far greater 
cohesiveness as a single bloc when negotiating with other similar regional 
groupings. In this sense Central America may be at a disadvantage in terms of 
cohesiveness and experience at the negotiation table. Furthermore, I would 
expect to find that economic factors help more than historical, political or 
cultural ones, in explaining the interests of both the EU and Central America, in 
pursuing closer interregional ties and an association agreement leading to a Free 
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Review of Literature 
The theoretical part of the discussion presented here, draws from two 
main sources on the phenomenon of interregionalism in international relations. 
The first of these is Hänggi et al, (2006) who bring together a wide ranging 
collection of studies on subject. These include theoretical discussions of the 
factors explaining interregionalism as well as studies of concrete examples of 
interregional institutional arrangements. Though the emphasis is on 
interregional relations between the Triad of major economic blocs (North 
America, Europe and East Asia), it also includes chapters on relations between 
these economic superpowers and groups of developing countries. For the 
purpose of this study, the chapters by Jörg Faust on EU-MERCOSUR relations 
and that of Andrew Crawley, on EU-Latin American relations more generally, 
are of particular interest. 
 
Hänggi et al (2006: 300-310) citing earlier studies by Jürgen Rüland, put 
forward five major functions of interregionalism:  (1) balancing, (2) institution 
building, (3) rationalising, (4) agenda-setting and (5) collective identity-
building. In the context of relations between the EU and Central America, the 
argument put forward in the present discussion will be that balancing and 
rationalising are the major objectives sought by both parties, particularly the 
European side, and that collective identity building, while important, is of 
  9 
secondary interest. I find little to support the view that either institution-building 




Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004: 6-15) look at the reasons behind the EU‟s 
interest in pursuing interregional policies, paying particular attention to its trade 
policies. This is the second major source by which the present discussion is 
inspired. The authors put forward four hypotheses to explain EU interregional 
policy. A “pluralist” hypothesis sees EU policy as a forum within which various 
interest groups compete for influence. From this perspective EU policy is 
determined by the relative influence of each group over the policy-making 
process. A “bureaucratic politics” hypothesis views the policy-making arena as 
one of contest between the various EU institutions, the main competition being 
between a free trade- oriented Commission and a Council more in tune with the 
demands of protected national interests. The third hypothesis they put forward is 
an “international systemic” one. According to this hypothesis, EU interregional 
trade policy is the result of the constraints and opportunities provided by wider 
international economic, political and security systems within which individual 
EU interregional relations are nested. Finally a fourth, “constructivist” 
hypothesis, sees policy as conditioned by the EU‟s desire to create a common 
European identity. The following discussion will argue that EU-CA 
                                                          
4
 It must be noted that interregionalism is discussed with major consideration to relations between the 
EU/US/East Asia economic triangle. I do not argue against the importance of these final two functions of 
interregionalism generally but rather their importance or applicability to the specific case of EU-CA relations. 
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interregionalism, while it potentially exhibits traits which would support each of 
the four hypotheses to varying degrees, is best explained by the presence of 
international systemic factors, with a secondary role played by concerns of EU 
identity put forward in the constructivist argument. 
 
Aside from its relative recent origins, interregionalism, as a phenomenon 
in international relations, is notable for the diversity exhibited by the various 
forms it takes. Roloff (2006) distinguishes five types of interregionalism, 
ranging from very loose relations between groups of states from two regions, to 
more institutionalised formal relations between two or more regional 
organisations (for example the EU and MERCOSUR). The fact that there are 
often more differences than similarities between various interregional 
associations makes it difficult to make general conclusions. Aggarwal and 
Fogarty (2004: 4-5) define a “pure” interregional agreement as one which 
“formally links two free trade areas or customs unions”. Where one party to the 
agreement is a free trade area or customs union and the other is not, they 
consider an agreement as an example of “hybrid iterregionalism”. EU-CA 
relations fit somewhere between, but more closely fit the model of “pure 
interregionalism”. Not all the countries involved in the Central American 
regional integration project are active participants in negotiations with the EU 
  11 
for an Association Agreement
5
. Unlike the now suspended EU-MERCOSUR 
negotiations, the EU is not making an official agreement between it and SICA. 
However, the majority of Central American states are involved in talks, and 
those that are involved, form a customs union (as of 2007). 
 
Mario Telò, in a wide ranging discussion of the links between 
globalisation, the new regionalism and interregional cooperation argues that the 
EU‟s role as a global civilian power is a primary concern in its Latin American 
policy and that European interest in reinforcing its interregional relationship 
with Latin America is firstly strategic, then economic (Telò, 2006:133). While 
he specifically uses EU-MERCOSUR relations as an example, he makes it clear 
that he sees these as part of a wider pattern of EU-LAC relations. While 
agreeing with his general conclusion, this paper contends that the EU‟s strategic 
interests in Central America are essentially economic in nature, to such an 
extent that it is very difficult to separate the two or to claim that one is more 
important than the other. „EU strategic interests‟ in Central America equates 
roughly with „European economic/business interests‟ although broader concerns 
also feature.  
 
                                                          
5
 Belize, a full member of SICA, comes under the Cotonu agreement as an ACP member as does the Dominican 
Republic, an associate member state. Panama, also a full member of SICA is currently participating in 
negotiations with the EU as an observer for the present 
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The literature on EU-CA relations, particularly in English, is very limited. 
Hazel Smith (1995) provides the best analysis. Smith looks at the origins of 
relations between the EU and Central America from the 1970s when the 
European Commission began to show interest in signing partnership agreements 
with the Central American Common Market (CACM) similar to those which 
existed at the time with ASEAN (Smith, 1995: 57), through the 1980s and EU 
involvement in the quest for a solution to the crises on the isthmus. She 
considers the strategic objectives of European policy in becoming involved, as 
well as the implementation of that policy, and discusses the importance or 
otherwise of the EU‟s role in the ultimate resolution of the conflicts in the 
region. For Smith (ibid:147-149) there were two major policy objectives of the 
EU: The containment of the Nicaraguan revolution through „constructive 
engagement‟ on the one hand, and the prevention of Nicaragua becoming overly 
reliant on the USSR and thus potentially escalating East-West tensions between 
Washington and Moscow. Ultimately these objectives were achieved. Nicaragua 
did not become a „second Cuba‟, the US did not invade, and the conflict did not 
develop into a full-scale East-West conflict (ibid: 149).  While not concluding 
that EU policy was central in any way to the achievement of these objectives, 
Smith does consider EU policy in Central America as having had a positive 
impact on the EU‟s image as an international actor, giving “a more substantial 
foundation” to EU policy-making in the short term (ibid, 154). 
  13 
 
 Hazel Smith‟s work, published, as it was in 1995, deals primarily with the 
early years of the San José process and the EU role in the Central American 
crisis. José Ángel Sotillo (1998) brings the discussion forward a little, focussing 
on the evolution of EU-CA relations from the end of the Cold War, through 
most of the 1990s. He pays particular attention to the way in which relations 
weakened following the easing of East-West tensions and the resolution of the 
conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador at the beginning of the decade. He looks 
to the content of the San José ministerial meetings from 1984 through 1998 as 
the basis for his argument noting a decreasing interest on the part of the 
European side.  
 
For Sotillo (1998: 253-254) both the EU (post-Maastricht) and Central 
America, (with the revival of integration in 1991) turned their focus towards 
internal matters. Furthermore, Central America, following the end of the Cold 
War, ceased to be a „nine o‟clock news issue‟ and lost its political significance 
for European policy makers. These two factors contributed towards a decreasing 
intensity of relations between both regions. Sotillo (ibid: 260) calls for a re-
evaluation of EU-CA relations
6
 and a renewed commitment to tackling issues of 
poverty and social exclusion which he views as dangerous threats to the 
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 With a leading role to be played by Spain in the process 
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achievement of peace and democracy in the region. He looks forward 
optimistically to the 1999 EU-LAC summit which he sees as an opportunity to 
do this. The argument presented in the following discussion largely concurs 
with Sotillo in the assertion that economic matters now take priority. However, 
the optimism expressed (given the benefit of hindsight of course) is not shared 
to the same degree. The promise held out by the Rio summit has yet to be 
realised ten years on. 
 
These then, are the main secondary academic sources from which both 
inspiration and support for the arguments presented here are drawn, though of 
course this is not an exhaustive review.      
 
The next section presents an overview of EU-CA relations as they 
currently stand and the ways in which they have evolved over the past two and a 
half decades. It focuses on political and economic relations as well as looking at 
a key aspect of relations – regional integration, and the current process of 
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   Political Relations 
Political relations between the EU and Central America have their roots 
in the crises of the 1980‟s in that region, particularly the armed conflicts in 
Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador. They take place in the framework of the 
San José Dialogue, the institutionalised format for political dialogue between 
both regions. 
 
This original San José process constitutes, for some analysts, one of the 
earliest and most successful foreign policies of the EU (e.g. Piening, 1997: 126).  
Others consider the lack of recognition of this point in either Europe or Central 
America somewhat surprising (Whitehead, 1999: 56).  European support, moral 
and financial, to regional proposals for negotiated settlements to the various 
disputes on the isthmus, may have been a factor in avoiding external 
intervention in the region and ultimately facilitating a non-violent resolution to 
the crisis. In any case the San José Process earned the EU a great deal of 
political capital in the region, at least among the political classes, if only by 
virtue of the fact that it provided moral support and legitimisation to their own 
peace efforts.  
 
  16 
Though Europe had no direct strategic interest in events in Central 
America, there were a number of plausible motives behind EU involvement in 
the quagmire that was Central American affairs in the 1980s. Among these were 
the desire for the EU to have a strong international voice, the fear of an 
escalation of the East-West conflict, and a Central American desire for a 
regional and inclusive (particularly of Sandinista Nicaragua) settlement. 
The San José dialogue, which was institutionalised in 1985, was renewed 
in 1996 in Florence, and again in 2002 in Madrid, has changed format over the 
years. The ministerial meetings, initially annual events, became biennial ones 
following the 1996 renewal. On alternate years meetings would be between 




By the early 1990s, the worst of the crisis had passed and the San José 
Dialogue became less significant as Central America ceased to become as major 
an international issue as it had been in previous years. Sotillo Lorenzo 
(1998:249-266) notes a shift in EU-CA relations over the course of the 1990s. 
Whereas earlier, the emphasis was on political relations, as the 1990s 
progressed, economic considerations took precedence over political dialogue 
which became less and less intense as the EU directed its economic attention 
towards more important partners (for example MERCOSUR in the Latin 
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 Comprised of the Foreign Minister of the country holding the presidency of the EU Council, the High 
representative of the CFSP, and the EU Commissioner for external affairs  
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American context) and towards international issues closer to home and of 
greater political and security interest, especially eastern Europe and the process 
of further European integration.  
 
As regards the focus of EU-CA political relations from the 1990s, the 
emphasis changed from conflict resolution to other matters such as the 
consolidation of democracy or human rights issues, and towards support for the 
process of Central American integration. Sotillo Lorenzo gives, as an example 
of this shift in emphasis, the ninth San José conference (San Salvador 1993). At 
this meeting, a new cooperation agreement was signed between both regions 
(Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement-PDCA) whose stated objective 
was to: “strengthen and diversify relations and cooperation in all fields of 
common interest, especially in the fields of economics, finance, trade, social 
issues, science and technology and environment, and to promote the 
reinforcement and consolidation of the Central American Integration System”8  
 
A look at the PDCA of 2003 would appear to confirm the conclusion that 
political relations are of secondary importance. Title II of the agreement, which 
deals with political dialogue, consists of just three short articles. The first 
(Art.3) outlines the dialogue‟s objectives. It confirms the parties‟ commitment 
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 Sotillo Lorenzo, 1998: 255.  Own translation from Spanish original 
  18 
to the San José dialogue and lists the areas to be covered.  The second (Art.4) 
outlines the mechanisms through which the political dialogue is to be 
conducted, while the third (Art.5) consists of a cursory acknowledgement of 
foreign and security policy and a vague commitment of both sides to coordinate 
positions and take joint initiatives within appropriate international forums. 
Overall the section dealing with political dialogue is short and vague when 
compared to the much longer section on cooperation which goes into much 
greater detail regarding issues relating to economic activity (trade, investment, 
energy, mining, technical regulation, industrial cooperation and so on). 
 
It is perhaps to be expected that emphasis should have changed from 
political to economic in the years since the San José Dialogue began. Central 
America did lose relevance as a political „issue‟ with the end of the Cold War 
and the resolution of most of the conflicts there by the early 1990s. However, 
the underlying social inequality which European and Central American leaders 
(correctly) identified as the source of conflict in the region is far from 
eradicated. There are many political issues (as the current „crisis‟ in Honduras 
demonstrates) which remain unresolved, and though political dialogue is 
continuing, the extent to which it has been overshadowed by economic 
considerations which have come to dominate the interregional agenda, 
  19 
represents perhaps something of a missed opportunity. It is to these economic 
factors that I will turn to in the following section. 
 
Economic Relations 
It is a contention of this study that economic factors are most important in 
understanding EU-CA interregionalism in the 21
st
 Century. Therefore, this 
section is directed towards providing an overview of economic relations 
between both regions and to highlight the most salient points which may 
provide some clues as to the motives behind the broader interregional political 
and cooperation agenda. This overview will focus on two main aspects of 
economic relations: Trade in goods on the one hand, and, on the other, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and services. 
 
In terms of trade, the EU imported approximately €4.7 billion worth of 
goods from Central America in 2007 with exports to the region of roughly €5.3 
billion
9
. EU-CA interregional trade is highly imbalanced in three senses. Firstly, 
Central America is much less important to the EU as a trading partner than the 
EU is for Central America, in the context of both regions‟ total foreign trade. 
EU exports to Central America account for just 0.43% of total EU exports while 
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 Source: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113478.pdf  [accessed 18 July 2009] 
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imports from the Region make up just 0.33% of all imports.  With a total of €10 
billion in trade in 2007, Central America ranks very low among the EU‟s most 
important trading partners. On the other hand, the EU is the second most 
important trading partner for Central America as a whole. The EU consumes 
13.3% of the region‟s total exports and provides some 11% of its imports. 
While in terms of total trade, the EU runs a distant second to the United States, 
it remains nonetheless a considerably important partner for Central America. 
 
Secondly, a major imbalance can be seen in the recent evolution of EU-
CA trade. EU exports to Central America, though modest, have increased in 
value a great deal more than have Central American exports to Europe despite 
the fact that overall Central American exports have increased significantly.  
Total exports from Central America rose from €23.8 billion in 2003 to €35.3 
billion in 2007, perhaps partly as a result of the Free Trade Agreement with the 
US (CAFTA). This represents an increase of some €11.5 billion or 48%. In the 
same period, exports to the EU increased only slightly, from €4.3 billion to €4.8 
billion, a rise of just €500 million, or 11.64%. On the other hand EU exports to 
Central America increased from €3.8 billion to €5.3 billion an increase of 
almost 40% between 2003 and 2007. 
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The third imbalance as regards trade can be seen within Central America. 
EU-CA trade is dominated, on the Central American side, by two countries:  
Costa Rica and Panama   (particularly Costa Rica). Combined, they account for 
71% of Central America‟s total trade with the EU. Costa Rica provides 64% of 
Central American exports to the EU alone (€3billion out of a total of €4.7 bn). 
The remainder of EU-CA trade is relatively evenly distributed among the rest of 
the Central American countries and in terms of volume is very small (as low as 
€275 million the case of Nicaragua for example, making the EU Nicaragua‟s 6th 
most important trading partner, behind Costa Rica and El Salvador) 
 
Trade between the EU and Central America follows a typical North-
South pattern. Central America primarily exports agricultural goods and raw 
materials to Europe, whose exports to the isthmus are comprised predominantly 
of manufactured goods. According to José Moisés Martín, of Grupo Sur, some 
70% of Central American exports to the EU are accounted for by just eight 
agricultural products
10
. However, unlike trade between the EU and 
MERCOSUR, the main agricultural exports of Central America do not, in the 
main, compete directly with EU agricultural produce, therefore, conflict 
between Central American producers and the protected European agricultural 
sector should be less of a barrier to free trade than is the case in other 
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 Source: Foro Europeo radio interview 
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interregional negotiations or those at the WTO level. Two sectors, which are 
important for Central America, however, do provide more of a stumbling block: 
bananas and, to a lesser extent sugar. These are major Central American exports 
which compete fiercely with the EU‟s own protected sectors in the case of the 
latter, or the interests of its small banana producing regions and ex-colonies in 
that of the former. 
 
At the end of 2001, EU investment stocks in Central America stood at 
€111 billion. Three years later that figure had risen to €200 billion and by year 
end 2006 the EU twenty seven held investment stocks to the value of over €287 
billion in the region
11
. Considering interregional trade in total (imports and 
exports) has never exceeded €10 billion in any one year, it is easy to see how 
trade is dwarfed by FDI in terms of volume and, perhaps, as an issue between 
both regional blocs. 
 
Much, though by no means all, of European investment in Central 
America is accounted for by Spanish firms. From the early 1990s in Central 
America, as in Latin America generally, the neoliberal policies of regional 
governments opened the doors to FDI, particularly through large-scale 
privatisation programmes. Large European, often Spanish firms took advantage 
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 Source: EU FDI Yearbook 2007 (for data from 2001-2005)  DG Trade website for 2006 figure 
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of these policies, investing heavily in sectors such as financial and insurance 
services, telecommunications, transport and public utilities. There was a shift 
away from investment in primary or secondary sectors and towards services 
from the 1990s onwards, in contrast with FDI from the US in the region which 
is more heavily concentrated on manufacturing
12
. As European transnational 
corporations are very much involved in the service sector, trade in services is 
more important, from an EU standpoint, than is trade in merchandise. 
 
Article 31 of the PDCA specifically deals with cooperation in investment 
promotion. The objective of cooperation in this field is the establishment of “an 
attractive and stable reciprocal investment climate” (Art. 31:1) and areas for 
cooperation are to include the development of a legal framework favourable to 
investment in both regions and promoting and protecting investment between 
EU member states and the Central American countries. (PDCA, Article 31: 2(b) 
and 31:2(c)). 
 
Another important point to note is that Central America has increased in 
importance as a destination for European FDI in the early years of this decade 
relative to other areas in Latin America. EU investment stocks in South 
America declined by 14% between 2001 and 2004 while in the same period, 
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 US investment focuses on manufacturing where costs are reduced and access to US market is relatively free. 
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those in Central America rose by 89% (EU Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook 
2007, p.16) 
 
Perceived obstacles to FDI in Latin America by European Firms  
    Source: Dunning, 200 1, p.67      








When considering European private interests in interregional relations in 
Central America, account must be taken of the role of private investors. As 
noted previously, investment in the region by EU firms vastly overshadows 
trade in terms of value. The above table, listing the primary concerns of 
European investors in Latin America might shed some light on the matter. 
Certain concerns, such as political instability, legal judicial insecurity, 
Political instability 
Local regulation and bureaucracy 
Legal judicial insecurity 
Corruption 
Fear of devaluation 
Violence 
Problems of repatriation of profits/capital 
Level of local taxation 
Underdeveloped infrastructure 
Social problems/poverty 
Lack of qualified human resources 
Local safety, health and environmental standards 
Underdeveloped local capital markets 
Cultural Differences 
  25 
underdeveloped infrastructure, corruption and violence, for example find strong 
echoes in the stated aims of EU policy regarding Central America (and indeed 
other regional sub-groups).  
 
Official EU investment policy considers that: “International rules on FDI 
contribute to improving the business climate by increasing legal certainty for 
investors and by reducing the perceived risk to invest
13
. It furthermore states 
that current investment policy is focussed on the various preferential trade 
agreements being concluded with various countries and regional blocs, 
including Central America with the goal of creating favourable investment 
conditions for European investors. 
 
This does not demonstrate that EU private investors are controlling the 
interregional agenda. However it does, at the very least, highlight a remarkable 
convergence of preferences, especially in relation to the establishment of stable 
political and economic rules conducive to encouraging investment. What is 
clear, however, is that in economic terms, investment and trade in services in 
the Central American market, is of greater importance than interregional trade 
in goods. European firms see great potential in the region and their interests 
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 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/investment/index_en.htm [accessed  24 July 2009] 
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cannot be discounted as a factor in relations between the regions. Global 
Europe provides many insights into the motives behind a new generation of 
FTAs with many groups and countries worldwide, including Central America.  
It states that these should try to achieve “the highest possible degree of trade 
liberalisation including far-reaching liberalisation of services and 
investment” (bold typeface mine). 
 
Regional Integration  
With the ending of most of the conflicts in the early 1990s, regional 
integration in Central America was given a new impetus. Such schemes were 
nothing new of course. The region had experienced similar initiatives in the 
Organisation of Central American States (ODECA) and the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) for example, but these projects had been dealt severe 
blows, first by the „Soccer War‟ of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras, 
then, in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the Sandinista revolution in 
Nicaragua and the Central American crisis that followed
14
. There has also been 
a long history of attempts at political unification in the isthmus since 
independence, and this tradition was one key factor in the resumption of the 
integrationist project (Sánchez, 2003:34). 
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 For an excellent analysis of the successes and failures of regional integration from the 1950s through the 
1970s, see chapter 10 in Woodward (1985). 
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Buoyed by the success of regional efforts to negotiate a settlement to the 
crisis, Central American leaders met in the Guatemalan city of Antigua to 
discuss the revival of the ODECA.  For Sánchez, the positive experience of the 
Esquipulas process was instrumental in encouraging renewed interest in future 
cooperation and regional integration and the process led to “a great sense of 
political integration in the region by the end of the 1980s (ibid). The presidents 
of six Central American states met in 1991 and signed the Tegucigalpa Protocol 
in the Honduran capital. This protocol, a modification of the 1962 ODECA 
treaty of San Salvador, created the Central American Integration System 
(SICA)
15
. The SICA, which officially came into existence in February 1993, 
was to be the overarching framework within which, integration would take 
place. 
 
The regional integration of the 1990s was quite distinct from the earlier 
version. Inward-looking and protectionist in nature, the „old‟ regionalism was 
replaced by a new variety of so-called „open‟ regionalism with an emphasis 
firmly placed on export-led growth and the reinsertion of Central America into 
the world economy. Similar initiatives of „open‟ regionalism sprung up 
throughout the hemisphere. New regional economic arrangements such as 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR were created in the early 1990s, while the old 
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 The founding members of SICA are: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. 
Belize joined in 2000, and the Dominican Republic is an associate member. 
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Andean Community of Nations (CAN), which, like the ODECA, had fallen into 
irrelevance, was also revived.  
 
Pro-market, neoliberal economic thought was dominant throughout the 
1990s in Central America as much as throughout Latin America as a whole. 
Governments in Central America pursued a trade liberalising agenda and a form 
of regionalism which attempted to restrict internal barriers as well as open the 
region up to foreign investment. Regional integration in Central America can be 
seen as a response to the pressures of globalisation. However, the purpose was 
not to shield the region‟s economies from international competition, but rather 
to liberalise and coordinate economic policy so as to make Central America 
competitive and to adapt to the threats and opportunities of the world economy. 
The effect was a synthesis of what Telò
16
 describes as the two typical (and 
contradictory) reactions of states to the increased speed and volume of financial, 
technological and trade globalisation: adapting to competition as a „competitor‟ 
state or pursuing regional integration – understood as a critical reaction to 
globalisation through territorial cohesion and protective social and economic 
policies (Telò, 2006: 107). A similar point is made by Whitehead, (1999: 67) 
who suggests that the threats posed by globalisation to the importance and 
effectiveness of the nation state prompted political elites to adopt new strategies 
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 This is not an argument that Telò explicitly makes though he does suggest that future  research may show 
evidence that states in some developing regions pursue both the „competition state‟ approach and the regional 
integration response simultaneously. 
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among which were regional integration schemes. Thus, the emergence of such 
schemes as well as bi-regional relations and agreements are very much part of 
the state‟s reaction to globalisation at the same time as they can be seen to be 
facilitating the advance liberal economic policy.   
 
It is important to raise the issue of regional integration in Central America 
as it is a key aspect of relations between the region and the EU. Europe has long 
been a major, even principal, external supporter of regional integration projects 
in Central and Latin America. The EU demonstrates a preference, where 
possible, to deal with countries on a region to region basis rather than 
individually
17
. Crawley argues that integration “is fundamental to an 
understanding of European-Latin American relations” and support for regional 
integration in Latin America as a pillar of EU policy towards the region 
(Crawley, 2006: 174). 
 
The furtherance of the process of Central American integration has been a 
key objective of EU-CA relations since the end of the Cold War but especially 
so over the course of the past decade. Reference is continually made to this in 
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 In the case of the Americas, NAFTA is a major exception in this regard. The EU has no group to group 
relations with NAFTA, though it has extensive relations with all three NAFTA members individually. This may 
be due to the preferences of the US as much as those of the EU and the fact that NAFTA does not have the 
mechanisms or institutions necessary for bilateral negotiations. 
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official documents such as the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP‟s) and in the 
PDCA 
 
Under the RSP for 2002-2006, the European Commission provided €75 
million in funding to Central America. Of this €40 million went to directly 
support the process of regional integration. This contrasts with the period from 
1984 to 2000, when, out of a total Commission budget of €450 million, only 5% 
was directed at integration (RSP 2007-2013: 15). The Regional Strategy Paper 
for 2007-2013 states that Regional Strategy for this period in Central America 




1: Strengthening the institutional System 
2: Reinforcing the process of economic integration 
And 3: Strengthening regional security 
 
Article eleven of the PDCA deals specifically with cooperation in the 
field of regional integration. It places particular emphasis on: “the development 
and implementation of a common market in Central America”. This was a 
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specific precondition of the EU side before negotiations could take place on an 
Association Agreement. 
 
Central America also commits to promoting : “the development of 
common policies and the harmonisation of the legal framework.... including 
sectoral policies in areas such as trade, customs, energy, transport, 
communications, environment and competition”      (PDCA: Article 11.3). 
 
The EU as the world‟s largest and successful example of regional 
integration has sometimes been seen as a model for such efforts in other 
regions. It has at times been suggested that the EU in its support for regional 
integration in Central America and elsewhere, is attempting to „export‟ the EU 
model of integration. Karen Smith casts doubts over such suggestions, 
highlighting the specific circumstances under which the EU was created
19
, the 
prevailing political conditions and the nature of the European states themselves, 
and questioning the transferability of the EU model to other regions (Smith, 
K.E, 2003: 70-72). The EC has also denied that this is an aim of the EU: 
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 Particularly the gradual nature of the integration process, the fact that European states were long-standing 
democracies, or at least had long democratic traditions, the recent memory of devastating war, security issues 
(Franco-German), support from the US for European Integration and the security provided by the US and 
NATO 
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  “The efforts of the EU to promote and support regional                                        
     integration among developing countries should not at  
     all be interpreted as an attempt to „export‟ the European 
     integration model. Clearly, there are different approaches 
     towards integration and economic development. It should 
     be recognised that the European model, shaped by the   
     continent‟s history, is not easily transferable or necessarily  
     appropriate for other regions.”20        
 
Support for regional integration and interregional forms of political 
dialogue and cooperation however, remains fundamental to the EU‟s dealings 
with Central America and with other regions of the developing world where 
such forms of interstate cooperation exist. Whether this support derives from a 
genuine belief, derived from the EU‟s own experience, in regionalism as a path 
to sustainable development for Central America or from a desire to create new 
markets for European Trade and investment by encouraging the establishment 
of stable, reliable rules and institutions favourable to European private interests 
is a different matter.  
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 European Commission Communication 95: 219  (cited in Karen Smith, 2003: p72) 
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The overall sense that one gets from reading either the Strategy Paper or 
the Cooperation Agreement is one of European eagerness for Central America 
to commit to integration measures such as the customs union, regularisation or 
homogenisation of customs procedures, capital markets, and investment rules 
and so on. Though issues of human rights and democracy are given pride of 
place in the preambles and early sections of these documents, the bulk of the 
provisions deal with technical issues related to economic matters. 
 
Towards an Association Agreement 
Current relations between the EU and Central America are very much 
centred on negotiations leading to the conclusion of an Association Agreement 
between the two regions. This proposed agreement would replace the current 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement as the basis for interregional 
relations. An Association Agreement is the most developed form of 
institutionalised bilateral relationship which the EU can have with a third party, 
be it a single state or a regional bloc. In the context of Latin America, the EU 
has already signed Association Agreements with two countries: Mexico (2000) 
and Chile (2002) and is in the process of negotiating others with the three main 
regional groupings: Central America, the Andean Community (CAN) and 
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MERCOSUR
21
. These Association agreements involve three key areas or 
pillars: Political Dialogue, Cooperation and Trade.  
 
The origins of the proposed Association Agreement are to be found in the 
series of EU-Latin American and Caribbean (EU-LAC) summits held since the 
initial Rio summit in 1999. Further summits have taken place in Madrid (2002) 
Guadalajara (2004) Vienna (2006) and Lima (2008).  These summits were 
initiated with a view to creating a new strategic relationship between the two 
regions. At the 2004 summit, EU and Central American leaders decided to 
initiate negotiations for the Association Agreement ( Article 2: 3 of the 2003 
PDCA explicitly states that one of the main objectives of both parties is the 
creation of conditions under which such an agreement along with a Free Trade 
Area, could be negotiated). At Vienna two years later, both sides reiterated their 
intention to begin negotiations once the Central American Customs Union had 
been established. The establishment of a customs union was the main 
precondition set out by the EU before the process could officially begin. 
 
Negotiations have taken the form of several „rounds‟ of discussions, held 
alternately in Europe (Brussels) and Central America (various major cities). To 
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 Although negotiations with all three groups are stalled at the time of writing, there are continuous efforts 
being made to restart the processes. 
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date there have been eight rounds of negotiations. Initially, progress was made 
relatively rapidly. Early rounds concluded as scheduled. Negotiations were 
temporarily suspended in April 2009 due to an issue with Nicaragua relating to 
the establishment of a fund designed to mitigate the asymmetry between Central 
America and the EU on one hand, and the asymmetries within Central America 
on the other. A ninth round, which was to have been the final round of 
negotiations, after which the Association Agreement would be signed, was due 
to conclude in July 2009 but following the „constitutional crisis‟ in Honduras, 
this round was suspended indefinitely and the planned entry into force of an 




Proponents of an Association Agreement and Free Trade Area argue that 
it will increase economic relations between both regions and lead to investment 
and job creation in Central America, leading ultimately towards the holy grail of 
sustainable development. On the other side, opponents of the  agreement 
counter that the proposals constitute nothing more than another FTA with a 
heavy emphasis on opening Central American markets to EU goods and capital, 
without affording many concessions on the issue of subsidies and other 
protectionist measures for European agriculture in particular. 
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  Spain has suggested re-starting talks in September without Honduras.  Source: 
http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2009/agosto/04/pais2047780.html [Accessed 17 August 2009] 
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Some civil society groups in Central America fear that the proposed 
Association Agreement is little more than the EU seeking to gain the same 
concessions for European business as those that have been granted to US 
interests under DR-CAFTA, thereby compounding the negative impacts which 
they claim have already resulted from the latter. The Central American 
Women‟s Network (CAWN), for example cite the impacts of DR-CAFTA on 
small local businesses and agricultural communities such as job losses and 
unfair competition from subsidised imports which they believe would only be 




Two other important issues have been raised in relation to the proposed 
agreement. Firstly, the secretive nature of the negotiations has been criticised by 
many. Secondly, the degree to which civil society is able to actively participate 
in negotiations has been a concern for several groups commenting on the 
process.  CAWN (2008: 3) claims that to date, the negotiations demonstrate “a 
lack of transparency” and that they have given “little priority to the participation 
of civil society including women‟s representation.” 
 
The Consultative Committee of SICA (CC-SICA), the organ of the 
Central American integration project which gives voice to the concerns of some 
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sectors of civil society, is accorded a role in the process of negotiations but that 
role is limited and, in any case, the CC-SICA leaves out many sectors of Central 
American society. 
 
Despite the fact that negotiations for an Association Agreement have 
reached an advanced stage, there are many question marks remaining and it 
cannot be said with any certainty that an agreement will be signed and come 
into force in the very near future. The constitutional crisis in Honduras has 
continued for longer than some might have predicted. New administrations have 
taken power in El Salvador and more recently Panama, which up until now has 
participated only as an observer but may now move towards fuller participation.  
The economic downturn of the past year is another factor which may have an as 
yet undetermined effect. It may lead to decreased trade but perhaps more 
importantly reluctance or an inability of EU investors to continue further 
investment in the region.  Most of all, throughout negotiations, particularly in 
the past year and months, opposition among social groups to the proposed 
agreement has been increasing and more light is being shed on the potential 
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  Interregionalism from an EU Perspective 
Hänggi et al. point to the increased importance of institutionalised 
relations between world regions (interregionalism) as a relatively new, and 
increasingly important phenomenon in international relations. EU-CA relations 
form part of this network of interregional arrangements. What explains the EU‟s 
propensity towards interregional relations, particularly with regard to trade? 
Why might Central American states see this form of dialogue as useful for the 
pursuance of their own goals?  These are the key questions to be addressed in 
this section.  As the EU is by far the larger of the partners in this process and as 
few studies are available on Central American economic or political strategy, 
the emphasis will inevitably be on interregionalism from a European 
perspective.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, Aggarwal and Fogarty (2006) put 
forward four hypotheses: „pluralist‟, „bureaucratic politics‟, „international 
systemic‟ and „constructivist‟, in order to explain EU interregional policies.  
Following Aggarwal and Fogarty‟s third hypothesis, it will be argued that the 
EU‟s interregional relations with Central America are best viewed as a product 
of the wider international context. 
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  International Systemic Factors 
Beginning with Aggarwal and Fogarty‟s third hypothesis the first point 
we can make, in the context of EU-CA interregionalism, and of wider EU-LAC 
relations, is that the most obvious threat to EU economic security comes from 
US competition in the region. EU policy in Central and Latin America, from the 
1990s onwards, is seen by many (for example Crawley, Hazel Smith, Bulmer-
Thomas among others) as partly, or in some cases  primarily as a response to 
US-led free trade initiatives in the western hemisphere. 
 
The timing of  EU actions or negotiations with Latin American countries 
or groups, or statements by EU leaders and officials often lends credence to 
such assertions. Throughout the 1990s, the administrations of George H.W. 
Bush and of Bill Clinton placed great emphasis on free trade arrangements 
between the US and Latin American countries. The creation of NAFTA was one 
major example of this. Following shortly after the creation on of NAFTA in 
1994, the EU, fearful of the negative effects the agreement would have on its 
commercial relations with Mexico, began trade negotiations and signed a trade 
agreement in 1995. Furthermore, for a number of years the expansion of 
NAFTA to include Chile was held out as a distinct possibility. An agreement 
was subsequently signed with Chile in 1997.  
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The renewed activism of the US in trade relations with Latin America 
throughout the 1990s prompted the EU to show ever greater interest in the 
region, fostering closer ties with the newly formed MERCOSUR as well as 
working closely with the Andean Community and Central America also. A 
major step taken by Europe was the 1999 EU-LAC summit at Rio, which 
proposed the establishment of a new „strategic partnership‟ between both 
regions. The current processes of negotiations for Association Agreements with 
all three regional blocs in Latin America stem from the series of subsequent 
EU-LAC summits since 1999. 
 
The greatest threat posed to the EU‟s economic interests in the region was 
the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which initially 
envisioned hemispheric free trade by 2005.  In 2001 Pascal Lamy
24
, then EC 
trade commissioner, announced that the proposed FTAA would damage EU 
interests, putting them at a competitive disadvantage in Latin American 
markets
25
. The current policy of the EU of negotiating bilateral and bloc to bloc 
FTAs in Latin America could even be seen as an attempt to create an FTAA but 
with Latin America linked to Europe rather than the United States. This point is 
made by  GRAIN (2008:  3-4) who note that with the already concluded AAs 
with Mexico and Chile, and those proposed with CAN, CA and MERCOSUR, 
                                                          
24
 Currently director general of the WTO 
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 Cited in Karen Smith, p.80 
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the EU and virtually all of Latin America, with the possible exceptions of 
Venezuela and Cuba, will form one enormous FTA. 
 
Although progress towards establishing the FTAA has stalled 
indefinitely, the US did succeed in negotiating a free trade area between it and 
Central America
26
, creating CAFTA (Later DR-CAFTA when the Dominican 
Republic joined). Critics of EU trade policy charge that this directly led to 
Europe‟s initiation of negotiations for an association agreement with the 
region
27
. The belief that EU eagerness to conclude an agreement stems from the 
threats posed by CAFTA is more than just a sceptical view of EU motives by 
opponents of globalisation. Global Europe, the EC‟s strategy for European 
competitiveness, for example, recognises that its trading partners in the 
developing world are negotiating FTAs with the EU‟s competitors and suggests 
that: “Where our partners have signed FTAs with countries that are competitors 
of the EU, we should seek full parity at least”.  Such statements by EU officials 
and leaders clearly indicate that perceived threats posed by economic 
competition with the US in Central America and the rest of Latin America are a 
key consideration for the formulators of EU trade policy. 
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 Comprising Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Panama is not party to CAFTA 
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 Source:  http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=152 [accessed 16/07/09] 
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A second set of international systemic constraints relates to the wider 
economic and security systems within which any set of interregional relations 
take place. As security issues between the EU and Central America are of 
minimal importance, it is more relevant for the purposes of the present 
discussion to look at economic considerations. From this perspective we might 
see the way in which EU-CA interregional economic relations are „nested‟ 
within the broader system of world trade established by GATT/WTO and also 
within global European trade strategies. 
 
One criticism of EU trade policy in respect of the Association Agreement 
with Central America is that the EU is simply attempting to achieve concessions 
at a bilateral or interregional level, what it has been unable to achieve at the 
WTO. Faust (2006: 165) makes the general point that the EU is more interested 
in pursuing progress of the global trade regime than in engaging in negotiations 
at interregional level.  
 
 It would come as little surprise to those who hold this view, that EU-CA 
negotiations for an Association Agreement did not begin in earnest until after it 
became clear that the Doha development round of WTO negotiations were not 
going to be completed in the short to medium term at least. In his analysis of the 
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EU-MERCOSUR partnership, Santander (2006: 51) claims that the accelerated 
pace of free trade negotiations in the early years of the new century were as 
much a result of the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun in 
2003 as of US moves to advance the FTAA project. EU relations with Central 
America are similar, in this respect, to those between the EU and the southern 
cone.  
 
This observation is supported by official EU Commission trade policy 
documents. Global Europe (2006: 3) explicitly states that the EC remains 
committed to the Doha Development Round as European trade policy‟s first 
priority, in spite of its suspension in 2006. Furthermore it confirms that a new 
series of bilateral and bloc to bloc trade negotiations form part of its strategy in 
response to the slow progress at the WTO. While the EU‟s preference may be 
for global free trade, interregional arrangements can be seen as a „second best 
strategy‟. With reference to this new generation of FTAs, Global Europe 
envisions these as running in parallel with efforts to resuscitate Doha. It warns 
that: “FTAs cannot be a substitute for multilateral liberalisation” and that they 
must be seen as “a stepping stone” rather than a “stumbling block” on this path 
(Global Europe, 2006: 16).  
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In addition to competitive advantages, these interregional negotiations 
offer other possible benefits from a European perspective. Firstly, they allow 
the possibility for issues not covered by WTO rules, such as intellectual 
property or investment regulations, to be negotiated. The second is that the EU‟s 
relative size (in these arrangements the EU will almost always be the stronger 
partner in negotiations, and usually by some distance) its coherence in economic 
policy and its experience of negotiations, will usually place it in a strong 
position to set the agenda. This is certainly the case in negotiations with Central 
America. 
 
   Collective Identity  
Aggarwal and Fogarty‟s fourth hypothesis looks at the relationship 
between EU interregional trade strategies and long standing concerns for the 
creation of a common European identity. The strengthening of a common EU 
identity is a much less tangible benefit of interregional relations than are 
concerns of economic security. However, this hypothesis argues that it 
(common identity): “is valued both in and of itself as well as a means to future 
policy goals” (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004: 15). By forming a common EU 
policy towards other regional groups the EU creates awareness of common 
European interests and presents a set of shared norms and values (such as 
respect for democracy, human rights and environmental protection among 
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others). The perception of these common interests and shared values contributes 
to an overall sense of common identity among EU citizens. The emergence of 
such an identity, the authors argue, is a necessary condition for the creation of a 
coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has long been an 
elusive goal of European integration.  
  
There is much in the history of EU-CA relations to support the view that 
the EU is seeking to generate a common identity. Europe‟s role in the San José 
Process is held up by the EU as an example of a coherent and successful 
common foreign policy. There is a great emphasis placed on values such as 
human rights, democracy and political stability in both the RSP and PDCA. 
Support for Central American integration is presented to a large extent as 
Europe, backed by its own experience of successful integration, encouraging 
other regions to achieve peace, stability and economic progress by following its 
lead. The role played by the EU and its member states as a major source of 
overseas development aid (ODA) to the region is one that is often highlighted in 
policy papers. The juxtaposition of an altruistic EU policy with that of the US 
which is primarily concerned with strategic security and economic interests, 
also suggests that at least on some level, interregional relations with Central 
America are intended to foster a greater sense of Europeanness. This sense of 
common identity can only be a positive thing from the perspective of those who 
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would seek deepened EU political integration and a greater role for the EU on 
the international stage. However, the vague and intangible nature of these 
benefits of interregional cooperation suggest that although a factor, concerns of 
EU common identity are of relatively secondary importance compared to 
economic ones. 
   
Other Factors Explaining EU Policy 
EU-CA interregionalism can primarily be explained in terms of the 
previous two factors (primarily international systemic ones with concerns over 
collective identity as secondary). Since EU-CA relations are principally a based 
on strategic policy in the context of neoliberal economic principles
28
 it is 
perhaps to be expected that other theories explaining EU interregional policy 
look at EU policy-making as an arena in which free trade and protectionist 
oriented interests vie for influence over policy outcomes. This sums up the 
thrust of Aggarwal and Fogarty‟s first and second hypotheses. We might expect 
to see intense competition between competitive manufacturing exporters and 
less competitive agricultural sectors reliant on EU protectionism as is the case in 
EU negotiations with MERCOSUR.  
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partnership but which I feel is equally applicable to the EU-CA relations. 
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However, perhaps because trade between the EU and Central America in 
terms of volume is almost insignificant in comparison, or because there is 
comparatively little competition between imports from Central America and EU 
agricultural producers, this tension, though it exists to some extent, is much less 
pronounced. Likewise, intra bureaucratic competition between the Commission 
and the Council is minimal in the EU-CA case. A possible exception could be 
seen in the role of grassroots organisations, and other civil society actors who 
oppose the process of global and interregional economic liberalisation. Instead 
of competition between pro-free trade and protectionist lobbies, there is a 
certain source of tension between the former and civil society actors warning of 
the negative impacts of such a process. 
 
Overall considerations of international systemic factors , principally 
competition with the United States on the one hand, and the global trade regime 
and the quest for global economic liberalisation on the other, go a long way to 
explaining the EU‟s policy of interregionalism in Central America. 
Interregionalism in this sense, serves a balancing function in that it helps the 
EU to offset US influence in the region, if only partially. It also serves a 
rationalising function in that it seeks to use the interregional forum in 
conjunction with mechanisms at the global level in order to obtain its desired 
results. 
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The next section will go on to look at the motivating factors on the 
Central American side, behind interregional cooperation with the EU. Though 
the region‟s objectives differ from those of its European counterpart, 
interregionalism serves broadly similar functions of balancing and rationalising 
as we shall see. 
 
Interregionalism from a Central American perspective 
Until now, the focus has been very much on the motivating factors for EU 
trade policy towards Central America. This brief section will turn to 
considerations from a Central American perspective. As noted earlier, there is a 
lack of academic work focussed on Central American trade policy, especially in 
English. However, there are a number of important comments to be made on the 
subject. 
 
In the first instance, similarly to the EU, the factors which push Central 
American states to pursue interregional relations and trade agreements with the 
European bloc can generally be divided into two categories: economic and 
political. Secondly, as with the EU, the emphasis is heavily on economic 
concerns. Thirdly, the interests of the Central American states vary and policy is 
less cohesive than that of the EU side. 
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There are a number of economic reasons why Central American states 
would have an interest in closer interregional cooperation with the EU. The first 
and most obvious of these has to do with access to markets. The EU, as the 
world‟s largest single market offers at least possibilities for increasing 
traditional exports and expanding newer non-traditional ones. As has already 
been noted, the EU accounts for a significant share of the region‟s exports and 
the prospect of an FTA holds out the possibility of further increasing this share. 
Francisco García of INCEP (2007: 12) suggests that a further incentive is to 
make permanent the temporary tariff reductions which CA exports enjoy in the 
EU market. Whether or not this is a valid argument remains to be seen as 
negotiations have not been concluded but some (for example José Moisés 
Martín of Grupo Sur (an alliance of European NGOs) criticises the EU position, 
arguing that it seeks to use WTO rules as a starting point for negotiations on 
trade, which, in fact offer less to CA exporters than the temporary bilateral 




Aside from trade, the perceived need to „insert‟ the region into the global 
economy by being more open to economic flows in order to attract increased 
investment continues to be a factor in CA‟s continued relations with the EU and 
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others. An association agreement with Europe might improve the region‟s 
image, presenting it as a modern, stable, and, most importantly, investor 
friendly region. In this sense, CA policy can be seen as a response to the 
challenges of economic globalisation, adopting the idea of a „competition state‟ 
but at a regional level. 
 
Other factors, particularly the region‟s relationship with the United 
States, may also inform EU-CA interregionalism from a Central American 
perspective. Closer EU-CA political ties as well as increased cooperation in 
trade may be seen as strategies to mitigate the overwhelming reliance on trade 
with, and enormous political influence of the US in the region. Despite 
European rhetoric, Central American historical and cultural ties with the United 
States have long been stronger than those with Western Europe. It could be 
argued that cooperation with the EU is a form of balancing, and allows Central 
America to expand its international relations. Monar (1997: 268) suggests that 
the assertion of an independent standing in international relations is one 
potential benefit of interregional dialogue and cooperation with the EU, citing 
the example of Australia vis-à-vis the United States and of Ukraine vis-à-vis 
Russia. Although perhaps not as dramatically as the latter, Central American 
leaders might view interregional relations with the EU in these terms, perhaps 
stemming more from the legacy of San José than current realities. 
  51 
 
Aside from balancing, another political factor in shaping CA policy can 
be found in regional integration. As the EU is the primary supporter of regional 
integration efforts in the region, closer relations between the two could be a way 
of strengthening the very process of Central American integration. As well as 
providing funds for, and generally supporting the process, relations with the EU 
provide an international forum for the various organs of regional integration, 
and negotiations force the individual states involved to negotiate a joint plan of 
action or set of proposals to bring to the table. There are potential benefits in 
that negotiating as a bloc with the EU should reinforce the process of 
integration, forcing individual governments to reach consensuated positions 
prior to negotiation and generally foster cohesiveness particularly in terms of 
economic policy. Central America, in its own way, could see these negotiations 
as a means of having a greater say in the formulation of international trade 
rules. These possible motives would be consistent with Santander‟s view that: 
“European persistence in recognising and supporting regional groups... as 
international actors in their own right, has... contributed to the strengthening of 
their internal structures and the reinforcement of their negotiation power 
internationally” (Santander, 2006: 50).  
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       Relevance of EU-CA Relations 
Given the general lack of academic interest in EU relations with Central 
America and the relative peripheral nature of these relations when compared 
with other interregional efforts at cooperation (for example between the EU and 
ASEAN, the EU and MERCOSUR or relations between Central America and 
the United States) the question could be posed as to what value there is in 
studying EU-CA interregionalism. 
 
Firstly, the study of interregionalism is in its infancy. The way in which 
the world‟s major economic blocs and various regional groupings have 
increasingly moved towards this form of cooperation is attested to by the 
plethora of regional and interregional acronyms that are a hallmark of modern 
international relations. While emphasis has naturally been placed on the way in 
which the bigger players interact, it is important to study the way in which the 
economic giants behave towards the regions of the developing world.  
   
Secondly, it is a historically appropriate time to take a look at relations 
between the two regions. The 25
th
 anniversary of the initial San José ministerial 
meeting makes this an ideal juncture at which to reflect on the direction of EU-
CA relations. It is also ten years on from the EU-LAC summit in Rio which 
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promised a new dawn for relations between both regions. Though a broad 
statement, it is nonetheless true, for most commentators, that progress on this 
front has been disappointing.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most significant is the role played by EU-CA 
relations in the wider context of EU-LA relations. As noted previously, EU-LA 
relations grew out of European involvement in the San José Process. Relations 
with the region‟s larger economic powers (MERCOSUR, Mexico and Chile) 
have since tended to dominate the EU-LA agenda. However, EU-CA relations 
may be about to take a lead role in hemispheric relations with Europe. The 
proposed Association Agreement if and when it is negotiated, is likely to be the 
first one of its kind between the EU and a Latin American regional group. In 
this sense it could have consequences for similar interregional agreements with 
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Concluding Remarks 
What conclusions can we draw then, regarding the state of EU-CA 
relations in the 21
st
 century? In terms of relations generally, I have argued that 
we can see three key characteristics of EU-CA relations and the way in which 
they have evolved over the past quarter century. The first is the asymmetrical 
nature of relation. Between the EU and Central America and within Central 
America itself relations exhibit a high degree of asymmetry. The EU is by far 
the larger partner in all senses, has far greater experience of negotiating as a 
coherent bloc and has more resources, all of which give it a distinct advantage 
when it comes to negotiating interregional agreements. There is also asymmetry 
in that countries within Central America have different economic strengths and 
some have more to gain than others by pursuing negotiations with Europe. 
 
A second important point is that strategic economic considerations have 
come to take precedence over political ones in the construction of closer ties 
between the regions.  Relations between both regions were once almost 
exclusively politically motivated. However, economic considerations have now 
come to dominate the interregional agenda. 
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A third, and related point is that though economic factors dominate 
relations, these are focussed primarily on the fields of services and investments, 
EU businesses have been heavily involved in investing, particularly in the 
provision of services (finance, transport, communications, utilities etc) and the 
EU has placed particular emphasis in its support for regional integration, on 
cooperation in the fields of investment protection and the regularisation of 
capital markets. 
 
Regarding EU-CA interregionalism, we can draw three broad 
conclusions. Firstly, interregionalism, like so-called new regionalism, is driven 
by the challenges and constraints posed by the processes of economic 
globalisation. 
 
Secondly, from an EU perspective, its policy in Central America is best 
explained by international systemic factors and two key strategic 
considerations: competition with the US for access to regional markets and 
pursuing a global free trade agenda on a region to region basis as a second-best 
strategy in the context of painfully slow progress at WTO level. 
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Thirdly, from a Central American perspective, involvement in 
interregional relations with the EU also serves a number of important strategic 
interests. Even allowing for asymmetries in size and economic importance, 
negotiations allow the countries of the isthmus to negotiate as a regional bloc 
giving them more influence and a louder voice in global economic matters than 
they would have as individual states. It also offers the opportunity for balancing 
its international political and economic relations. Central American states like 
those all over Latin America, have been preoccupied, since the 1990s, with 
access to global markets and insertion into the world economy. Closer ties with 
the EU form part of their strategy to achieve this.  
 
It is difficult, in a restricted space, to discuss all aspects of EU-CA 
relations and many topics have had to be sacrificed in the attempt to present a 
coherent view of said relations. Chief among these is the role played by the EU 
as a leading donor of overseas development aid (ODA) in Central America. The 
EU institutions (chiefly the commission) and individual member states provide 
hundreds of millions of Euro annually to help fund various important social and 
environmental projects in Central America quite aside from aid given to 
deepening regional integration. The EU has overtaken the US as an aid donor 
throughout Latin America including Central America which had been 
particularly dependent on US aid. 
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Other questions, such as the institutional framework for EU-CA 
interregionalism or the negotiation process between both sides are topics which 
it has not been possible to discuss given restrictions of space. Of course, since 
negotiations have not, at the time of writing been concluded and owing to the 
relatively secretive nature of these negotiations, it would be difficult to provide 
a clear and decisive analysis of the process. However, these might provide the 
basis for useful further research. One area of particular interest would be the 
role of civil society in the negotiation of an Association Agreement. 
 
The degree to which the San José Process actually helped to bring about a 
peaceful resolution to the Central American crises of the 1980s is debatable. 
However, on a fundamental level it offered an example of a positive foreign 
policy whereby the EU supported Central American initiatives and regional 
solutions to regional problems, either by providing financial resources, or just 
moral support and a political space within which to work. In the intervening 
period, EU-CA relations have undergone significant change, and bear very little 
resemblance to those of the 1980s. Firstly, whereas the motivation for 
interregional cooperation from 1984 to the early 1990s was almost exclusively 
politically driven, on both sides, since then strategic considerations, especially 
those of an economic nature have come to define relations between both 
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regions. Secondly, the San José dialogue was fundamentally driven by Central 
American leaders, with the EU acting in more of a supporting role, initially of 
the Contadora process, then later of Esquipulas. The current EU-CA 
interregional agenda however, is very much set by the European side. Support 
for regional integration is one area where this is evident. The EU, through its 
funding of various integration projects and initiatives, and the insistence on 
further and deeper integration as a pre-condition for an Association Agreement, 
is driving forward the process of Central American integration much more so 
than Central American political leaders or societal groups themselves. In this 
way the EU is also controlling the both the pace and content of the process, 
ensuring that the type of regional integration that emerges is potentially one 
which favours European business rather than the needs of Central American 
society. 
 
The fundamental difference between the European and US approaches to 
the crises of the 1980s was in their respective assessments of the root causes 
political conflict. EU leaders saw poverty and social inequality as the main 
source of the crisis. The extent to which these problems still persist might teach 
us a lot about the success or otherwise of EU policy. In its RSP for 2007-2013, 
the EC highlights many of the same social problems, such as uneven income 
distribution, serious educational problems, unemployment and 
  59 
underemployment, and food security among many others (RSP: 5-7). 
Nevertheless, the single greatest priority of EU-CA interregional relations 
continues, from an EU perspective, to be the process of regional integration, 
with a strong focus on economic integration and cooperation in the fields of 
services and investment. 
In seeking to pursue a policy that will provide more benefits to European 
business interests than to the peoples of developing regions, in this case Central 
America, the EU is missing an opportunity to promote the lofty goals of 
democracy, respect for human rights, regional integration and sustainable 
development, which it claims are at the heart of its relations with the region.   
 
The EU continues to use capital gained from the perceived successes of 
San José and continues to present itself as an „honest broker‟ in the region. 
However, as civil society is becoming more and more aware of, and 
increasingly draws attention to, the motives behind its policy in the region and 
the negative consequences it brings, this mask is beginning to slip. A 
fundamental re-think of policy is necessary if the EU truly wants to narrow the 
gap between the rhetoric of its policy doccuments and offical statements, and 
the reality of the actual effects of its strategic, pro-EU business approach in the 
region. 
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